中国的医疗卫生改革的开展已经日深月久,受制于经济条件、治理模型、运行机制、利益分配、地域差别、人口众多等等诸多问题,改革总是不尽如人意。当然,我国的医疗卫生事业日新月异的快速发展、社会公众不同程度的受益是一个不争的事实。然而,就像奥巴马总统先生论文所提到的那样,如何在医疗卫生的可及性、可承受性和医疗质量提升几方面得到更好的发展,构建一个国家和个人都能负担得起、医疗质量更佳的医疗保健体系,在这些方面却还有许多工作要做。这里将奥巴马总统先生论文中,对政策制定者们提出的经验教训译出,供中国的卫生政策制定者们参考。英文原文附后,欢迎对照阅读。译文错漏,敬请指正修改。
中文译文
对于平价医疗法案广泛而深远的意义,历史学家将会给出他们的结论,然而我有我自己的心得。这些经验教训不仅仅是留给子孙的,我也会将它们融入在我的总统任期内的医疗保健政策和其它相关公共政策的实践之中。
第一个教训是任何变革都是困难的。尤其困难的是面对激烈的党派之争。对于共和党而言,凡是我支持的任何法规提案,他们都会放弃自己的观点而加以拒绝。例如,在2003年他们支持一个资金累计的风险管控计划和一个公共计划退出国家老年医疗保险药品救济方案,但是他们却反对将这些计划纳入平价医疗法案的之中。2006年,在马萨诸塞州他们支持一个个人托管计划,却反对将其纳入平价医疗法案。2007年,在加利福尼亚州他们支持雇主支付令计划,但是仍然反对纳入平价医疗法案,之后又反对行政决定而导致延期。此外,他们还依据资金不足的理由,反对日常例行的法案修正、过多监管和苛刻的诉讼,共和党在暗地里削弱了平价医疗法实施的效果。我们之间应该有更多、更广泛、更有效率的合作,而不是阻碍。这项战略给共和党带来的政治红利并不明显,却明影响到了国家开销,最为明显的是估计有400万美国人处于无医疗保险的境地,由于他们生活在共和党执政而且有强大医疗保险计划的社会里。
第二个教训是特殊利益长期阻碍变革。我们和一些医疗保健组织和机构一起卓有成效的工作,如主要的医院协会,让国家老年人医疗保险计划的一部分以联邦财政补助的形式支付给没有医疗保险的人们。还有,例如制药工业就坚决反对涉及药品价格的任何变革,无论我们的理由如何充分而适度,他们却只关心自己的利润。我们需要继续铲除特别有趣的美元政治,但是我也需要继续增强从事医疗保健的使命感,为人们带来负担得起的脑脊髓灰质炎疫苗和青霉素的广泛应用。
第三个教训是在政策立法和实践中关注实用具有重要意义。面对单一支付和政府全包这一政策光谱的两端,采用更简洁的方法来解决医疗保健中所存在的问题。当我们在公共利益和私人利益之间找到共同点,并不断调整,那么我们的国家就会得到更好的发展。那是我就平价医疗法案实施提出的建议。我们与国会协商,讨论已经证实的多种医疗改革的思路,以确保它们得以通过,并能得到后续的调整。这还包括放弃一些已经失灵的计划,例如已经立法通过的自愿长期医疗照顾计划。这就意味着,当某个计划衰退时将其关闭,并重新启动一个新的计划。当HeaIthCare.gov一天没有工作时,我们引进了救援人员,诚实苛刻地评估问题,疯狂的工作,从而使得网站得以继续运行。这次救援的成功和网站继续工作,得益于我们创建一个基于国家政府层面的救援应急预案。
英文原文
While historians will drawtheir own conclusions about the broader implications of the ACA, I have my own.These lessons learned are not just for posterity: I have put them into practicein both health care policy and other areas of public policy throughout mypresidency.
The first lesson is that any change isdifficult, but it is especially difficult in the face of hyper partisanship.Republicans reversed course and rejected their own ideas once they appeared inthe text of a bill that I supported. For example, they supported a fully fundedrisk-corridor program and a public plan fallback in the Medicare drug benefitin 2003 but opposed them in the ACA. They supported the individual mandate in Massachusetts in 2006but opposed it in the ACA. They supported the employer mandate in California in 2007 butopposed it in the ACA and then opposed the administration''s decision to delayit. Moreover through inadequate funding, opposition to routine technicalcorrections, excessive oversight, and relentless litigation, Republicansundermined ACA implementation efforts. We could have covered more ground morequickly with cooperation rather than obstruction. It is not obvious that thisstrategy has paid political dividends for Republicans but it has clearly comeat a cost for the country, most notably for the estimated 4 million Americansleft uninsured because they live in GOP-led states that have yet to expandMedicaid.
The second lesson is that special interestspose a continued obstacle to change. We worked successfully with some healthcare organizations and groups, such as major hospital associations, to redirectexcessive Medicare payments to federal subsidies for the uninsured. Yet others,like the pharmaceutical industry, oppose any change to drug pricing, no matterhow justifiable and modest
becausethey believe it threatens their profits. We need to continue to tackle specialinterest dollars in politics. But we also need to reinforce the sense ofmission in health care that brought us an affordable polio vaccine and widelyavailable penicillin.
The third lesson is the importance ofpragmatism in both legislation and implementation. Simpler approaches toaddressing our health care problems exist at both ends of the politicalspectrum: the single payer model vs government vouchers for all. Yet the nationtypically reaches its greatest heights when we find common ground between thepub1ic and private good and adjust along the way. That was my approach with theACA. We engaged with Congress to identify the
combinationof proven health reform ideas that could pass and have continued to adapt themsince. This includes abandoning parts that do not work, like the voluntarylong-term care program included in the law. It also means shutting down andrestarting a process when it fails. When HeaIthCare.gov did not work on day 1,we brought in reinforcements, were brutally honest in assessing problems, andworked relentlessly to get it operating. Both the process and the website weresuccessful, and we created a playbook we are applying to technology projectsacross the government.
二0一六年七月十五日
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