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如何遏制日本与中国的紧张关系?

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最近《经济学人》的封面描绘了这样一幅画面,日本首相安倍晋三身着超人服装,飞向战斗机两侧的旗帜下,它是一只鸟吗?这是一架飞机吗?不......这是日本!

文章配图

这幅漫画表明日本已经转了一个弯,将朝着更自信的外交和国防政策发展。

从安倍晋三的意图来看,在未来几年内,东京不大可能采取从根本上遏制北京的防御姿态。相反,广泛的国内外因素可能会限制对日本的国防开支和防御能力,并导致东京继续与北京协同作战的整体政策。

然而,越来越多的人支持在日本不断扩大的军事能力和野心,尤其是在最近期的钓鱼岛事件上。同样重要的是,安倍晋三和他的支持者执意要修改日本宪法。日本近代史的改变,肯定会招致其他亚洲国家,特别是中国和韩国的举动,这是肯定的。虽然这是值得商榷,这些努力是否会成功,现在看来还很难超越。

与此同时,在未来,虽然北京是不可能搞领土扩张,但也不会退缩,从目前的领土争端上看,北京拥有更自信的姿态。这几乎是肯定的,中国在日本附近不断增加其军事和准军事能力。即使经济增长速度缓慢,中国将能够维持国防开支的增加,其在亚太地区的军事实力,包括日本附近,在未来几十年稳步增长。

总而言之,这些趋势表明,在未来几年内,东京和北京可能会发现都需要越来越多的安全,这是关于两国利益的竞争。为了减轻这种安全竞争,在这两个国家的决策者需要通过外交手段来确保共同安全稳定。

在短期内,这应该涉及到制定交战规则,非正式的理解,沟通渠道和机制,这将有助于预防危机的出现,尤其是在空中和海上的那些可能出现的结果的事件。

从长远来看,双方需要同时与美国的对话,设法解决西太平洋的军事部署问题,两国可以接受。这些都是一些结论,在最近的卡内基基金会的报告,在2030年中国可能与美日联盟。

日本的前景

最近在日本那些主张走向军事正常化的人们认为,东京将朝着成为完全正常的军事实力发展,到2030年取得重大突破。总体而言,许多因素表明,日本对中国的防御反应是可能受到限制的。国内外各种影响,包括宪法的约束,规范值,政治和官僚,预算的限制,这都有可能限制日本的军事任务。此外,日本的广泛的经济利益对于中国可能起到稳定作用。同样,他们还鼓励中日合作,美国对日本的希望向来如此。

然而,虽然东京是不太可能公开对中国的竞争策略,这是完全可能的。日本将向“协同作战的方向移动。”这样的轨迹会导致军费持续开支略高于1%的国民生产总值,这意味着每年的国防预算的增加,而日本经济增长缓慢。彻底修订宪法的第9条,禁止使用武力解决国际争端和维护正规武装部队,在这样的政策导向下,东京肯定会重新解释宪法第9条。这种重新解释允许日本适度扩大在美日同盟的作用,促进盟国之间的协调。

但是,据日本观察家,在未来几年,如果右翼代表和安倍主张获得更多的支持,他们拒绝对日本过去的战时行为批评,这将更积极响应中国在有争议的钓鱼岛及其附属群岛的自信,并部署其西南岛屿的第一岛链兵力,在未来可能引发危机或冲突。

最后,应该指出,不难想象的是,东京对付北京应该采用柔和的对冲。如果中国采取的姿态被看作是不太自信和威胁。在这样的政策轨迹下,国防开支水平可能停滞不前,甚至下降,国防预算可能会再次低于国民生产总值(GNP)的1%。这样的情况也是可能的,如果日本在其他领域取得进展,如朝鲜半岛无核化。

中国展望

相对于日本,北京是最有可能继续奉行“参与和对抗”的方针,在这个双重战略下,中日可能像不同的轨迹上的两个木板。北京将采取非常积极的政策,完全抛弃与东京合作,除非中共内部的政权或外部危机的发生。相反,在未来的二十年中,在其外交和安全政策的方面,中国将极有可能追求“自信的实力”或“谨慎崛起”。

在张扬的实力方面,中国对日本采取更强硬的立场,特别是在领土和历史问题,虽然双方在经济和政治进行过合作。这将更有可能发生,如果中国继续强劲的经济增长,并面临着相对稳定的内部政治条件,这将使北京方面去追求更大的扩张能力。如果东京继续冲撞北京的政策,特别是挑衅性的政策,尤其是在钓鱼岛问题上,后果将很严重。

另外,北京也有可能与东京合作,虽然它不太可能做出重大让步,如在钓鱼岛争端上。虽然中国的能力和意愿将有所减弱,但仍然会继续在该地区扩大其军事能力。相对而言,与日本相比。这种政策取向的可能性更大,如果中国的经济增长放缓或国内政治动荡。在这种情况下,在北京的领导人可能会寻求一种稳定的国际环境,这更有利于经济发展。这种做法也是可能的,如果与台湾的两岸关系保持稳定,如果东京和华盛顿避开盟国的政策,威胁有可能升级。

迈步向前

鉴于这些趋势,北京,东京和华盛顿不可能发生全面战争,直到2030年中国与美日结成同盟。然而,潜在的紧张局势和频繁的危机,都有可能会出现。因此,从长期来看,双方需要共同努力维护太平洋地区的和平,中国和美国也需要相互理解。

这将涉及到中国和日本在东中国海的领土摩擦。首先,双方需要共同努力建立机制,预防和管理潜在的事件的发生,包括空中和海上沟通和理解。其次,日本应以某种方式承认中国钓鱼岛争议的存在。最有可能的是,东京最终需要默许承认与中国在钓鱼岛问题上的某种形式的共享。然而,在此同时,中国应避免任何单方面的摩擦升级。同样的道理,日本应避免在岛屿上建立某些建筑物。第三,每一方应重申的东海联合开发协议,并采取具体行动,实施该协议。

更广泛的军事姿态是,日本也需要采取措施,增加对中国的防御威慑能力。这应该包括整个西南诸岛的防卫能力,增加海岸警卫队的监测和在中国东海的巡逻,提高快速反应的能力。日本自卫队也应努力加强与美国军方的操作性,特别是在后方保障。然而,在追求这些功能方面,日本应避免面对的更具威胁性的军事能力。例如,广泛的弹道导弹或远程打击能力。这有可能直接危险到日本的防卫能力。

从长远来看,日本和中国也将需要相互了解对方的军事类型,坦白承认对方合法的政治和安全问题。尤其是,中国必须寻求一种新的机制,而不是仅仅把东海作为一种有效的禁区。同样,日本应该避开中国海军。

除了这些传统的安全问题,双方应努力加快深化经济一体化,包括进行双边和多边贸易协定。还应该加强在军事和扩大非传统安全问题上的合作。此外,安倍晋三应该避免与中国的正面对抗行为,对二战期间日军暴行道歉或停止参拜靖国神社。

同样重要的是,为促成中日的这种行动,华盛顿不仅需要继续按照北京的要求解决钓鱼岛争端,但也应敦促东京方面承认现有的争议,更积极劝阻安倍晋三停止各种挑衅性的外交政策。

当然,这些措施的具体实施将需要东京和北京方面采取大胆的政治眼光和熟练的外交手段。这可能难以实现,也并不能保证在任何情况下都取得成功。但是,目前的策略是不可能维持太平洋地区的安全环境,也不有利于日本和中国的长远利益。

How to Contain Japan-China Tensions

A recent Economist magazine coverportrays Japanese PrimeMinister Shinzo Abe clad in superhero costume, flying through theair flanked by fighter jets under the banner, “Is it a bird? Is ita plane? No… It’s Japan!” This caricature represents a growingsense that Japan has turned a corner toward a more assertiveforeign and defense policy.

Despite Abe’s intentions, Tokyo isunlikely to adopt aradically expanded defense posture aimed at containing Beijing incoming years. Rather, a wide range of domestic and external factorswill likely place constraints on Japanese defense spending andcapabilities and lead Tokyo to continue an overall policy ofcooperative engagement with Beijing.

However, there is growing support in Japan for dealing firmlywith China’s expanding military capabilities and ambitions,especially in light of the most recent crisis over theSenkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Equally important, Abe and his highlyconservative supporters are bent on revising Japan’s constitutionand affirming an interpretation of modern Japanese history, movesthat are sure to provoke other Asian nations greatly, especiallyChina and South Korea. While it is questionable whether theseefforts will succeed, at the very least, the cooperative elementsof Tokyo’s stance toward Beijing are likely to be combined with anincreasingly hard hedge.

At the same time, although Beijing is unlikely to engage infuture efforts at territorial expansion, it is also unlikely toback down from its more assertive stance on current territorialdisputes. And it is almost certain to increase its military andparamilitary capabilities and presence near Japan from theircurrently modest but growing levels. Even if economic growth ratesslow, China will be able to sustain significant annual defensespending increases that will enable its military power in theAsia-Pacific region, including areas near Japan, to grow steadilyover the coming decades.

Taken together, these trends suggest that Tokyo and Beijingare likely to find themselves engaged in a growing securitycompetition in coming years that could prove destabilizing to theregion and deleterious to the interests of both countries. Tomitigate this security competition, policymakers in both countriesneed to prioritize skillful diplomacy and implement stable mutualsecurity reassurances.

In the short term, this should involve efforts to establishrules of engagement, informal understandings,communicationchannels, and other mechanisms that will facilitate the preventionand management of crises, particularly those that could arise asthe result of incidents at air and sea.

In the longer term, the two sides – necessarily through asimultaneous conversation with the United States – will need tograpple with the question of what type of deployment pattern anddistribution of military power in the Western Pacific they canaccept.

These are some of the conclusions we and our co-authors reachin a recent Carnegie Endowment report,China’s Military and theU.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment (though theviews expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those ofthe other report authors).

The Outlook for Japan

Despite the recent ascendancy in Japan of those who advocate amove toward military normalization, it is unlikely that Tokyo willmake a major breakthrough toward becoming a fully normal militarypower by 2030. Overall, numerous factors suggest that Japan’sdefense response to China is likely to be restrained. Variousdomestic influences, including constitutional constraints,normative values, political and bureaucratic factors, and budgetarylimitations, are likely to limit growth in Japanese militarymissions and capabilities. Moreover, Japan’s extensive economicinterests vis-à-vis China are likely to act as stabilizing ballastfor the relationship. Similarly, U.S. interests in encouraging acooperative Sino-Japanese relationship will continue, as will, inall probability, U.S. preferences against full-fledged Japanesenormalization.

However, though Tokyo is unlikely to move toward an overtlycompetitive strategy toward China, it is quite possible, evenlikely, that Japan will move in the direction of “cooperativeengagement with a hard hedge.” Such a trajectory would involvesustained defense spending at or slightly above a level of 1percent of GNP, which would mean limited absolute increases in theannual defense budget as the Japanese economy slowly grows. Andalthough outright revision of Article 9 of the constitution – whichforbids both the use of force to settle international disputes andthe maintenance of regular armed forces – would probably not occurunder such a policy orientation, Tokyo will almost certainlyreinterpret its understanding of certain applications of Article 9.Such a reinterpretation could permit a modestly expanded role forJapan in the U.S.-Japan alliance and facilitate coordinationbetween the allies.

This hard hedge could become significantly harder, however, ifthe rightward politics represented and advocated by Abe gain moremomentum in coming months and years. According to knowledgeableJapanese observers, he intends to reject past criticisms of Japan’swartime behavior, respond more aggressively to Chineseassertiveness regarding the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, andpossibly push for Japan to acquire and deploy (on its southwestislands) the capability to obstruct Chinese naval transit to theocean beyond the first island chain during a future crisis orconflict.

Finally, it should also be noted that it is not inconceivablethat Tokyo might instead adopt a softer hedge toward Beijing.Particularly if China were to adopt a posture that is seen as lessassertive and threatening, this development could combine withJapan’s domestic constraints mentioned above to presage a turn to amore accommodating posture toward Beijing. Under such a policytrajectory, defense spending levels could stagnate or even declinein absolute terms, and the defense budget could again fall below 1percent of GNP. Such a scenario would also be more likely ifJapan’s threat perceptions in other areas reduce – for example, ifprogress is made toward denuclearization of the KoreanPeninsula.

The Outlook for China

In a similar manner to Tokyo, Beijing is most likely tocontinue to pursue an overall “engage and hedge” approach towardJapan, although the degree of emphasis placed on the two planks ofthis dual strategy could vary under different trajectories. It isunlikely that Beijing will adopt a highly aggressive policyorientation that entirely jettisons efforts at cooperation withTokyo, barring the occurrence of a particularly destabilizinginternal or external crisis that precipitates the emergence of amuch more nationalist Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime. Rather,over the coming two decades, China will most likely pursue eitheran “assertive strength” or “cautious rise” orientation in itsforeign and security policy.

In an assertive strength trajectory, China would adopt a morehawkish stance toward Japan, particularly on territorial andhistorical issues, although it would couple this stance withcontinued efforts at economic engagement and political cooperationwith Japan. This trajectory would be more likely to occur if Chinacontinues to experience robust economic growth and faces relativelystable internal political conditions, which would enable Beijing tohave the financial and political capital to pursue an even greaterexpansion in military and paramilitary capacity and presence withinand beyond its contiguous seas. It is also more likely if Tokyocontinues to move toward a hard hedge in its policy toward Beijing– particularly if Japan adopts highly provocative policies towardresource and territorial disputes, such as establishing a formalpresence on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

In a cautious rise trajectory, Beijing would emphasizecooperation and accommodation with Tokyo, although it would stillbe unlikely to make major concessions on disputes such as that overthe Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Although China’s capacity andwillingness to increase its military capabilities and presencewould be somewhat diminished under this trajectory, Beijing wouldnonetheless continue to expand its military capabilities in theregion in absolute terms – and perhaps even in some areas, relativeterms compared with Japan. This policy orientation is more likelyif China’s growth slows or if domestic political turmoil increases.Under this scenario, leaders in Beijing would likely seek toprioritize a stable international environment that is moreconducive to economic development and less likely to enflamenationalist public sentiment that could become redirected towardthe CCP or ensnare the CCP leadership in unwanted commitment traps.This trajectory would also be more likely if cross-Strait relationsremain stable and if Tokyo and Washington eschew policies thatBeijing might perceive as threatening or escalatory.

The Role of the U.S.

As indicated in these outlooks for Japan and China, the UnitedStates will undoubtedly play a major role in shaping theSino-Japanese security relationship and the defense policiesadopted by each side in the coming two decades. Although leaders inmany Asian capitals, including Tokyo, are currently uncertain aboutthe U.S. commitment to the region – fueled in part by worries overthe state of the U.S. economy and its capacity to sustainsufficient levels of defense spending and deployments – a majorwithdrawal or hollowing out of the U.S. presence in the WesternPacific is highly unlikely. Rather, on balance, the U.S. is likelyto recover, at least partially, and maintain a position ofeconomic, military, and political strength in the region – thoughit will almost certainly not be as dominant in these respects as ithas been in the past.

Indeed, Washington will continue to place a high strategicpriority on the Asia-Pacific region in coming years. In terms ofits policy toward Japan and the alliance, America’s principalobjectives are and will continue to be (1) to reduce fears in Japanof either entrapment or abandonment by the U.S.; (2) to facilitatethe peaceful handling of Sino-Japanese territorial disputes andencourage the development of a more cooperative overallSino-Japanese relationship; and (3) to maximize the likelihood thatTokyo will acquire the policies and capabilities needed to defendU.S. and allied interests in the face of a likely more assertive,capable Beijing.

These objectives will lead the U.S. to favor some Japaneseefforts to enhance its defense capabilities both politically andmilitarily, especially those measures that will better enable theJapanese Self Defense Forces to provide integrated intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and rear-area support.However, they will also lead Washington to discourage Tokyo fromadopting provocative measures that could heighten tensions withBeijing surrounding resource and territorial disputes andhistorical issues. In particular, the Washington is likely todiscourage Tokyo from pursuing a jettisoning or fundamentalrevision of Article 9.

Moving Forward

Given the combination of these trends in Tokyo, Beijing, andWashington, it is unlikely that full-scale war – hot or cold – willbreak out between China and Japan or the U.S.-Japan alliance by2030. However, the potential for heightened tensions and morefrequent crises between the two sides will likely grow. As aresult, over the long term, the two sides need to work together toestablish a mutual understanding regarding the balance of power inNortheast Asia that will accommodate Japanese, Chinese, andAmerican security concerns alike.

The most important first steps relate to Chinese and Japanesemilitary and paramilitary presence and resource and territorialclaims in the East China Sea. First, the two sides need to worktogether to establish mechanisms to prevent and manage potentialaccidents and other incidents at air and sea, includingcommunication channels and understandings about rules ofengagement. Second, Japan should in some way recognize theexistence of a dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,as part of a larger understanding regarding mutual restraint byboth Beijing and Tokyo. Most likely, Tokyo will eventually need totacitly acknowledge some form of shared presence near the islands.However, in the meantime, China should refrain from any unilateralescalation of its military or paramilitary presence in the area. Bythe same token, Japan should avoid building structures orestablishing a physical presence on the islands. Third, each sideshould reaffirm a commitment to the 2008 agreement on jointdevelopment of resources in the East China Sea and take concreteaction toward implementing that agreement.

In terms of broader military posture, Japan also needs to takesteps to increase its defensive deterrent capacity vis-à-vis China,given the projected increase in PLA capacity and presence nearJapan. This should include enhanced ISR capabilities throughout thesouthwest islands, increased Coast Guard monitoring and patrols inthe East China Sea, and an improved rapid reaction capability. TheJapan Self-Defense Forces should also work to enhanceinteroperability with the United States military, particularly interms of ISR integration and rear-area support. While pursuingthese capabilities, however, Japan should avoid developing a morethreatening military capacity—for example, an extensive ballisticmissile or long-range strike capability with ranges beyond that ofNorth Korea—that would only serve to escalate China’s militaryefforts or provoke China to pursue capabilities that could provemore directly dangerous to Japan.

In the longer term, Japan and China will also need to reachmore fundamental understandings about the level and type ofmilitary and paramilitary presence each side is willing to acceptfrom the other, frankly acknowledging each other’s legitimatepolitical and security concerns. In particular, China must not seekto establish the East China Sea as an effective no-go zone forJapanese ships. Similarly, Japan should eschew efforts to establishits chain of islands as a barrier to Chinese naval, paramilitary,or commercial vessels.

Beyond these traditional security concerns, the two sidesshould accelerate efforts to deepen their economic integration,including through bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. Theyshould also enhance military-to-military contacts and expandcollaboration on nontraditional security matters. In addition, Abe(and other leading Japanese politicians) should certainly refrainfrom undertaking inflammatory actions such as repudiating pastapologies for Japanese atrocities during World War II orvisitingthe Yasukuni Shrine.

Equally important, to facilitate such actions, Washington notonly needs to continue pressing Beijing to moderate its behaviortoward the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, but also should urgeTokyo to find a formulation to approach the imbroglio that willacknowledge the reality of a dispute, while more activelydiscouraging Abe from taking the kinds of highly provocativeforeign policy moves and stances mentioned above.

Admittedly, these steps will require bold political vision andskillful diplomacy in Tokyo and Beijing. Many of them will bedifficult to implement and are not guaranteed to succeed inreassuring the two sides in any event. But current strategies areunlikely to remain capable of ensuring a stable securityenvironment in Northeast Asia conducive to both Japanese andChinese interests over the long term.

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